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NON-TECHNICAL SUMMARY
Environmental regulation. What economists usually associate with these
words are barriers to competitiveness. The association of Porter (1991) and
Porter and van der Linde (1995) is a different one. By relying on a few
case studies, they argue that even if stringent regulations impose costs on
affected firms, regulations can trigger innovations which finally overcom-
pensate regulatory costs. This view has become known as the Porter hy-
pothesis which postulates a so called “win-win” situation that is supposed
to improve both environmental quality and firms’ profitability.
We attempt to test this hypothesis based on comprehensive data of firms
from Germany. In contrast to previous empirical work, we distinguish in-
novations that directly reduce resource consumption (and thus externali-
ties) of the innovating firm on the one hand, and innovations that only
reduce environmental externalities without increasing resource efficiency
on the other. For both types of environmental innovation we separate be-
tween regulation-induced and voluntary innovations. Compared to firms
that did not introduce any type of environmental innovation, both regu-
lation induced and voluntary innovations that improve resource efficiency
increase profitability. This positive effect is larger for regulation driven in-
novation since they lead to an 1.4 percentage point increase in profitability
(measured with return on sales) while voluntary innovations only increase
profitability by 0.8 percentage points. However, innovation that reduces en-
vironmental externalities reduce firms profitability by 0.8 percentage points
if they are regulation-induced whereas voluntary abatement investment of
this type does not lead to significant profitability effects.
We use data from the German Community Innovation Survey (CIS) in
2009 (the Mannheim Innovation Panel 2009) since it includes a set of ques-
tions on environmental innovation adoption and whether this is due to reg-
ulation. German CIS data are an appropriate data source since Germany is
one of the most regulated countries in the world.
DAS WICHTIGSTE IN KÜRZE
Ökonomen verbinden mit dem Begriff Umweltregulierung üblicherwei-
se staatliche Maßnahmen, die die Wettbewerbsfähigkeit von Unternehmen
einschränken. Porter (1991) und Porter und van der Linde (1995) verbin-
den dagegen mit dem Begriff Umweltregulierung das Gegenteil. Auf Basis
einiger weniger Fallstudien stellen sie fest, dass selbst dann, wenn Regulie-
rung zu zusätzlichen Kosten für die betroffenen Unternehmen führt, diese
Kosten durch Erträge aus regulierungsinduzierten Innovationen mehr als
ausgeglichen werden. Dieser unterstellte Zusammenhang wird als Porter-
Hypothese bezeichnet, die eine sog. „win-win“-Situation bei Umweltregu-
lierungen unterstellt, d.h. eine Verbesserung sowohl der Umweltqualität als
auch der Wettbewerbsfähigkeit von Unternehmen.
In diesem Beitrag testen wir diese Hypothese mithilfe eines umfassen-
den Datensatzes von Unternehmen aus Deutschland. Im Gegensatz zu bis-
herigen Studien unterscheiden wir zwischen Umweltinnovationen, die den
Ressourcenverbrauch und somit auch Umweltexternalitäten verringern und
solchen, die nur Umweltexternalitäten verringern, ohne gleichzeitig die Res-
sourceneffizienz des innovierenden Unternehmens zu erhöhen. Weiterhin
unterscheiden wir, ob diese beiden Arten von Umweltinnovationen auf-
grund staatlicher Regulierung oder freiwillig eingeführt worden sind. Ver-
glichen mit Unternehmen, die keine der beiden Arten von Umweltinno-
vationen eingeführt haben, ist die Umsatzrendite von Unternehmen, die
Ressourceneffizienzinnovationen eingeführt haben, im Durchschnitt höher.
Dies trifft sowohl für regulierungsinduzierte als auch für freiwillig einge-
führte Innovationen zu. Regulierungsinduzierte Innovationen erhöhen die
Umsatzrendite um 1,4 Prozentpunkte und damit höher als freiwillig ein-
geführte Umweltinnovationen (+0,8 Prozentpunkte). Innovationen, die nur
externe Effekte reduzieren, verringern die Umsatzrendite, allerdings nur
dann, wenn diese Innovationen durch Regulierungen ausgelöst wurden.
Die Umsatzrendite ist in diesem Fall um 0,8 Prozentpunkte geringer als bei
Unternehmen ohne Umweltinnovationen. Im Gegensatz dazu haben frei-
willig eingeführte Innovationen, die Umweltexternalitäten reduzieren, kei-
nen signifikanten Effekt auf die Rentabilität.
Diese Ergebnisse beruhen auf Daten des deutschen Teils der europawei-
ten Innovationserhebung (CIS) des Jahres 2009, dem Mannheimer Innova-
tionspanel 2009. Der Datensatz beinhaltet einige Fragen zu Umweltinnova-
tionen und ob diese aufgrund von Regulierungen eingeführt worden sind.
Daten zu Unternehmen aus Deutschland eignen sich besonders für unsere
Fragestellung, da Deutschland schon seit langer Zeit eine besonders starke
Umweltregulierung hat.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Economists usually associate negative impacts of environmental regula-tion on firm competitiveness. Porter (1991) and Porter and van der
Linde (1995) proposed a different view, however. By relying on a few
case studies, they argue that even if stringent regulation imposes costs on
affected firms, regulations will trigger innovations which finally overcom-
pensate regulatory costs. This relationship has become known as the Porter
hypothesis, or to be more precisely, the “strong” version of the hypothesis,
see Jaffe and Palmer (1997). Moreover, Porter and van der Linde (1995)
identified both, environmental (social) and corporate (private) benefits to
be a result of more stringent environmental regulation. They conclude that
environmental regulation improves firms’ competitiveness in the long run
accompanied with an improved environmental performance. The advoca-
cies of this point of view refer to this as a “double-dividend” or a “win-win”
situation.
This supposed “win-win” situation has not been untouched by oppo-
nents since it does not offer any comparison of costs and benefits of envi-
ronmental regulation. Such a “[. . . ] comparison of the benefits and costs is
exactly how one should determine the economic attractiveness of specific
programs - not on the false premise of cost-free controls.” (Palmer et al.
(1995), p. 131).
The approach we decide to adopt is to evaluate the costs and benefits
of environmental regulation at the firm level by looking at the profitability
effects of regulation-induced innovations. Firm profitability reflects both
costs to cope with regulation, as well as either enhancing or decreasing pro-
ductivity effects of environmental technology.
Environmental innovations are new products, processes or procedures
(including the adoption of existing technology) that aim at reducing envi-
ronmental impacts of firm activity or of using firms’ products. Such in-
novation can either be imposed by government regulation or introduced
voluntarily. While any environmental innovation is characterised by de-
creasing environmental externalities, environmental innovation may also
increase the innovator’s productivity, e.g. by increasing resource efficiency
(energy and material consumption per unit of output) or increasing product
demand through higher quality characteristics of products. These produc-
tivity gains may overcompensate costs of introducing environmental inno-
vations and thus increase firm profitability.
In line with this argument is the study of Berman and Bui (2001). They
pointed to the fact that firms’ pollution abatement costs do not correctly pre-
dict regulation’s impact on their profitability. As they argue, this is the result
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why the literature founds mixed evidence on the productivity effects of reg-
ulation in general. Our approach differs from Berman and Bui (2001) in the
way how to unmask the overall firm-level effects of regulation on competi-
tiveness as we look in detail on the profitability consequences of regulation-
induced innovations. We analyse whether introduced in response to regu-
lation differ in their impact on profitability compared to voluntarily intro-
duced environmental innovations. We distinguish two types of environ-
mental innovations; those reducing environmental externalities and those
reducing per unit consumption of environmental costs (energy, materials).
We assume the Porter hypothesis not to hold in general, but only for regu-
lation which forces firms to increase efficiency while regulations aiming at
lowering externalities will harm firms’ profits. In this regard we provide
further empirical evidence referring to Porter’s hypothesis. This is needed
since “the evidence offered in support of this hypothesis is largely anecdo-
tal” (Jaffe and Palmer (1997), p. 610). We employ firm level data taken
from the German part of the Community Innovation Survey conducted in
2009, containing information on environmental innovations and their link
to regulations for almost 4,000 firms across all sectors.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: The following sec-
tion provides a brief survey of the literature relevant to our research ques-
tion. The econometric implementation is described in section III. where we
also pay attention to construct reliable controls. A discussion of the results
is presented in section IV. Section V. concludes.
II. RELATED RESEARCH
The aim of this paper is to shed more light on the Porter hypothesis and
whether it holds in general, especially with regard to different types of en-
vironmental innovation introduced in response to regulation. However, do-
ing empirical work on this question is somewhat challenging since a “[. . . ]
systematic economic analysis is hindered by ambiguity as to exactly what
the hypothesis is” (Jaffe and Palmer (1997), p. 610)1. This critique refers to
the initial paper of Porter (1991, p. 168), where he claims: “Strict environ-
1Using the terminology of Jaffe and Palmer (1997) it is possible to distinguish between
three versions of the Porter hypothesis: the “narrow” one, the “weak” one, and the “strong”
version. We use the term Porter hypothesis to refer to the strong version. The strong version
states that “[. . . ] properly designed environmental standards can trigger innovation that
may partially or more than fully offset the costs of complying with them.” (Porter and van
der Linde (1995) p. 98). This is a widely adopted interpretation and this is also what the
present paper is interested in. The weak and the narrow version are quite similar. While
the narrow version states that “certain kinds” of regulation induces innovation, the weak
version states that regulation in general will induce “certain kinds” of innovations, see Jaffe
and Palmer (1997).
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mental regulations do not inevitably hinder competitive advantage against
foreign rivals; indeed, they often enhance it. Tough standards trigger inno-
vation and upgrading.”
For the latter sentence in the quoted passage, there is strong evidence
for this relationship (the narrow version of the Porter hypothesis) to ex-
ist. Newell et al. (1999) find empirical evidence that, beside other factors,
governmental regulation induces energy efficiency innovations. Relying on
patent data, also Lanjouw and Mody (1996) provide empirical evidence
in support of the regulation-induced innovation thesis. Brunnermeier and
Cohen (2003) show that pollution abatement and control expenditure, as
a measure for regulatory burdens, stimulate innovations. Counter to these
studies, Snyder et al. (2003) does not find any significant impact of regula-
tion on technology adoption at all. Using macro-level panel data, Jaffe and
Palmer (1997) find no significant impact of regulatory compliance costs on
patent applications, remaining the narrow version of the Porter hypothesis
unsupported. A survey of the literature dealing with the impact of environ-
mental regulation on environmental innovation - the narrow Porter hypoth-
esis - is offered by Jaffe et al. (2002).
For the first sentence in the quoted passage, there is overwhelming ev-
idence that this relationship does not exist. On of the most seminal con-
tributions demonstrating that regulation is a barrier to competitiveness is
the study of Greenstone (2002). He examines the effect of the U.S. Clean
Air Act amendment regulation on industrial activity and finds that capital
stock, output and jobs (590,000 in 15 years) were lost in counties with more
stringent regulations. Gollop and Roberts (1983) identify a negative impact
of U.S. Clean Air regulation on productivity growth of 56 examined elec-
tric power plants. Christainsen and Haveman (1981) arrive at even stronger
conclusions: They attribute 8-12 % of the United States’ (U.S.) productivity
slowdown between 1965 and 1979 to environmental regulation. Opposed
to these finding, Berman and Bui (2001) show that regulated oil refineries
faced productivity growths compared to non-regulated ones. Other stud-
ies look at the impact of regulation on production plant location. Becker
and Henderson (2000) show that Clean Air Act regulation caused produc-
tion plant births in areas with more stringent regulation to fall "dramati-
cally" compared to areas where regulation was less stringent. There is thus
a possibility that tight regulation forces firms in pollution-intensive indus-
tries to relocate to areas with less stringent regulation to maintain profitabil-
ity. Henderson (1996) find that this is indeed the case, see also List et al.
(2003). A survey of this strand of the literature is offered by Brunnermeier
and Levinson (2004). Jaffe et al. (1995) survey the early literature on the
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impact of environmental regulation on a country’s overall competitiveness
and conclude that the adverse effect of regulation on a country’s competi-
tiveness is rather small. Another strand of literature looks at the competi-
tiveness effects of regulation in terms of firms’ financial situation. Empir-
ical work by Rassier and Earnhart (2010), Konar and Cohen (2001) and
many others reveal evidence that regulation lowers a firm’s market value
and consequently future financial performance. Evidence for this result also
appears in Canõn-de-Francia et al. (2007). They identified innovative com-
panies to suffer from smaller losses in market value than non-innovative
ones.
In the widely adopted interpretation of Porter’s hypothesis (the strong
one), Porter and van der Linde (1995) claim that regulation induces in-
novation that finally improves competitiveness. However, in light of the
literature presented above, the question may arise why regulation should
be beneficial for the firm via its impact on innovation whereas most of the
mentioned studies attributed adverse effects to regulation? Put it otherwise:
Also the strong version of the Porter hypothesis may not hold in general.
This sceptic view is supported by a study related to the strong version of-
fered by Gray and Shadbegian (1998). They find that pollution abatement
investment (i.e. the adoption of clean technology innovation) due to regu-
lation crowds out other productive investment.2 Crowding-out is found to
be very strong (188 percent). This result implies that even if regulation trig-
gers cost saving environmental innovations that might increase profitability,
these innovations may crowd out other productive investments that could
have increased firms’ profitability even the more.
Porter and van der Linde (1995) suppose that firms are unaware of pos-
sible gains from innovation and that they, as a consequence, engage in too
little innovative activities. This argument seems to be borrowed from evo-
lutionary approaches based on the important contribution of Nelson and
Winter (1982). They argue that the allocation of R&D expenditure within
a firm, e.g. for process improvement, is determined by routines based on
experiences of former R&D projects, rather than by optimization behavior.
Consequently, there may be potentials for further process or product im-
provements by allocating more resources to R&D. The Porter-Hypothesis
claims that environmental regulation can solve this information problem.3
A simulation model offered by Popp (2005) addresses this "under invest-
2Popp et al. (2009) find that energy R&D crowds out normal R&D, but energy R&D is
not triggered by regulation in this study.
3In contrast to this information problem, Ambec and Barla (2002) develop a theoretical
foundation of the Porter hypothesis where the information problem is due to asymmetric
information between shareholders and the management.
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ment" in R&D due to uncertainty of the R&D outcome. It assumes that “[...]
a profit maximizing firm will only choose to invest in R&D for environ-
mental innovations if an environmental policy is in place” (Popp (2005) p.
7). An interesting result of the model is that complete offset of regulatory
costs due to successful R&D occurs only in a minor share of simulation trials
and under very specific parameter specifications. In contrast to this finding,
the model of Mohr (2002) offers results generally in support of the strong
version of the Porter hypothesis. However, the model rests on the crucial
assumption that two technologies exist with the new one always improv-
ing both productivity and environmental. Mohr (2002) concludes that an
environmental policy that forces firms to adopt the new technology will in
the long-run lead to a “win-win” situation. Also assuming the new technol-
ogy to be more productive and less pollution intensive, Xepapadeas and de
Zeeuw (1999) arrive at contrary results, not finding a win-win situation in
their theoretical model.
Finally the interested reader is referred to the survey of Brännlund and
Lundgren (2009) for further literature approaching the Porter hypothesis
rather from theoretical or modeling perspectives. A very recent and by far
the most comprehensive survey of the hypothesis is offered by Ambec et al.
(2011). Since theoretical literature dealing directly with the strong version
of the Porter hypothesis produces ambiguous results, we believe that there
is a case for more detailed empirical research at the firm level. The the next
section discusses our empirical strategy.
III. MODEL AND DATA
Based on the insights from the surveyed literature, this section starts
with defining hypothesis which will be brought to an empirical test.
A. Hypotheses Drawn from the Literature
The literature presented above strongly stresses that innovations induced
by environmental regulation cannot be expected to improve profitability per
se, since environmental innovation is the introduction of an abatement tech-
nology in the production process or embodied in products which first of all
implies additional costs with limited direct benefits for the innovating firm.
However, this view neglects that the abatement technology could lead to
energy or material savings in the production process. In addition, a better
environmental performance of products may differentiated the innovators
products from competitors which may either lead to higher demand or al-
lows for higher product prices. Profitability effects of regulation-induced
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environmental innovation are thus ambiguous.
Our first hypothesis is that different types of environmental innovations
differ in their impact on profitability. Innovations that increase resource
efficiency of the innovator or for the user of the innovators’ products are
expected to positively affect profitability compared to firms refraining from
any innovation or firms with environmental innovations that only reduce ex-
ternalities. With regard to regulation-induced environmental innovations,
our second hypothesis is that the Porter hypothesis only holds for innova-
tions that improve resource efficiency, but not for pure externalities reduc-
ing environmental innovations. In case of voluntary environmental innova-
tions, we expect positive or at least neutral profitability impacts (hypothesis
three) as firms will invest in such innovations only in case they expect addi-
tional profits.
B. Empirical Model
To investigate these hypotheses, we start from a simple model of firm
profitability. Profits per unit of output (pi) of firm i equal product price (p)
less costs per unit of output (c):
pii = pi − ci (1)
Assuming that all firms in a given market face the same supply and fac-
tor market conditions (i.e. prices for inputs, labour and capital are uniform
across all firms in the same market), product price (p) will depend on prod-
uct differentiation (which is regarded as a result of prior product innovation
- PD) and market structure (MS), i.e. whether a firm is able to raise its price
over the equilibrium price due to market power. Environmental innova-
tions (EI) can affect product prices similar to product innovations in case a
better environmental performance of products enables firms to raise prices
over competitor products.
pi = fp(PDi,MSi, EIi) (2)
Unit costs of firms may differ as a result of process innovation (PC) which
will lead to more efficient production as well as scale economies and the
level of technology used (ST ). Environmental innovations (EI) will in-
crease unit costs due to higher costs for implementing abatement technol-
ogy, though they can also lower unit costs if environmental innovations lead
to more efficient production.
ci = fc(PCi, STi, EIi) (3)
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Based on this conceptualisation, we derive our empirical model of firm prof-
itability:
pii = α + βEIi
+ γ1PDi + γ2PCi + δ1
′MSi + δ2
′STi + δ3
′Ci + εi (4)
The vector C represents a set of further control variables to account for sec-
tor heterogeneity and heterogeneity of regional economies. α is a constant,
β to δ are coefficients and ε is a firm specific error term.
The coefficient β represents the effect of environmental innovation in
general (EI) on firm-level profitability (pi). To investigate the first hypothe-
sis regarding the aggregation bias of environmental innovation in general,
a second model will be estimated where EI is distinguished into two types
t = 1, 2, namely (resource) efficiency improving innovations (t = 1) and
externality reducing innovations (t = 2), see equation 5.4




+ γ1PDi + γ2PCi + δ1
′MSi + δ2
′STi + δ3
′Ci + εi (5)
If the first hypothesis holds, the coefficients β1 and β2 must be significantly
different from each other. To investigate the second an third hypotheses,
environmental regulation has to be introduced into the model. To do so,
both types of innovation are allowed to be regulation-induced (r = 1) or
non-regulation-induced (r = 2), see equation 6.






+ γ1PDi + γ2PCi + δ1
′MSi + δ2
′STi + δ3
′Ci + εi (6)
If the second hypothesis holds, namely that the Porter hypothesis only holds
for regulation-induced resource efficiency improving innovations, β11 is must
be positive and significant. Furthermore, the coefficient of regulation-induced
externality reducing innovations (β12) must be significant and negative since
we expect this type of innovation to harm firms profitability if, and only if,
it is regulation-induced. For the hypothesis three to hold, we must observe
β21 and β22 to be either positive significant or at least not negative and sig-
nificant. Porter and van der Linde (1995) argue that firms can be unaware of
4To study the impact of regulation-induced environmental innovation on profitability
in general, a version of equation 4 is also estimated where EI is either regulation-induced,
or non-regulation-induced.
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potentials for further process improvement so that regulation can improve
firm’s profitability. If this would be the case the coefficient of regulation-
induced innovations that improve resource efficiency (β11) must be larger
than the coefficient of voluntary ones, β21.
C. Firm Innovation Data
In order to test our hypotheses, we use data from the German part of
the Community Innovation Survey (CIS). The German contribution to CIS
is the so-called Mannheim Innovation Panel (MIP) which is an annual sur-
vey based on a panel sample and conducted by the Centre for European
Economic Research located in the city of Mannheim. Using German data is
particularly useful for our research since Germany has relatively stringent
environmental regulations for many years and thus provides an appropriate
testing ground for our hypotheses.
We use the 2009 wave of the MIP since this wave includes a set of ques-
tions on environmental innovations which allows us to construct our key
model variables. In contract to most other CIS, the German CIS also sur-
veys information on firm profitability and market structure which is needed
to establish our control variables. The gross sample of the 2009 wave con-
sists of 29,807 enterprises (excluding neutral losses due to firm closure). The
sample is stratified by sector (56 sectors at the 2-digit level of NACE rev.
2.0), size class (8 classes according to the number of employees) and region
(West Germany and East Germany). The target population are enterprises
with 5 or more employees from most economic sectors excluding farming
and forestry, hotels and restaurants, public administration, health, educa-
tion, and personal and cultural services.
The MIP is conducted as a mail survey, including an option to respond
online. Following a first contact by postal mail, firms that did not respond
after six weeks were contacted by telephone to remind them to participate,
accompanied by sending them another copy of the questionnaire. After
another six weeks, a second reminder followed. 7,657 firms provided us-
able responses which corresponds to a response rate of 26 percent which is
of usual magnitude for voluntary mail surveys in Germany (Grimpe and
Kaiser (2010)), particularly when considering the substantial length of the
questionnaire. Sector and size composition of the net sample does not dif-
fer significantly from the gross sample, indicating representativeness of the
net sample in terms of the sector and size distribution of the German firm
population.
In order to control for a possible selection bias between responding and
non-responding firms in terms of their innovation status, an extensive non-
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response survey was conducted, surveying 4,829 enterprises by telephone.
This survey revealed a higher share of innovating firms among the non-
responding firms (63.1 percent) compared to the net sample of responding
firms (54.3 percent). This information is used to re-calculate weights when
computing weighted figures or running weighted analysis but of less con-
cern for our study (Janz et al. (2001); Peters (2008)).
The sample used in the present analysis includes 3,878 observations, i.e.
about half of the total net sample. The reduced sample size for model esti-
mations results from the fact that many firms did not provide information
on all our model variables. In terms of sector composition, the subsample
does not differ significantly from the full net sample. In terms of firm size,
the mean number of employees in the subsample used for estimation is 495
(median: 35), compared to 542 (median: 30) in the full sample of the Ger-
man 2009 CIS. Smaller firms are thus overrepresented in our sample which
mostly covers small and medium sized firms whereas other studies dealing
with the Porter hypothesis or regulation driven environmental innovation
take large companies into account or rely on macro-economic data.5 For fur-
ther descriptive statistics of variables that are going to be discussed in the
following subsections, see table 4 in the appendix.
D. Measuring the Model Variables
Profitability - We measure profitability by the 2008 pre-tax returns as a
share in total sales. Firms reported return on sales within seven ordered
categories with known thresholds, see table 3 in the appendix.
Environmental Innovations - The CIS conducted in the year 2009 contained
a harmonised question on environmental innovations (see Kemp and Pear-
son (2008)). Environmental innovations are defined as product, process,
marketing or organizational innovations which lead to a significant reduc-
tion of environmental burdens. In this sense it does not play any role whether
the environmental benefits of innovations are an explicit goal or rather a
byproduct of innovations. The environmental benefits could either appear
at the innovating firm or at the customer. Environmental innovations in-
clude the introduction of an abatement technology by firms regardless whet-
her this is a market novelty due to own R&D or just the adoption of existing
technology. The rational behind this view of innovation is that firms can
hardly distinguish whether a new used abatement technology is novel to
the whole market or only novel to the firm. The German version of the CIS
5The studies of Konar and Cohen (2001) and Canõn-de-Francia et al. (2007) for in-
stance use data of firms listed at the stock market which are without any doubts large
firms. Rassier and Earnhart (2010) use data of publicly owned firms.
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distinguishes 12 different dimensions of environmental innovations (which
deviates from the harmonised CIS questionnaire which distinguishes 9 di-
mensions). Out of these 12 dimensions, nine refer to processes and three to
products. Table 1 below summaries the 12 dimensions.




DIMENSION OF SHARE IN EFFICIENCY EXTERNALITY
ENVIRONMENTAL BENEFITS SAMPLE IMPROVING REDUCING
(t=1) (t=2)
PROCESS INNOVATION
Reduced material use per unit of output 35.12 % X -
Reduced energy use per unit of output 40.82 % X -
Reduced CO2 emissions 32.16 % - X
Reduced other air emissions (e.g. SOx, NOx) 22.86 % - X
Reduced water pollution 22.13 % - X
Reduced soil pollution 14.36 % - X
Reduced noise burden 23.22 % - X
Replaced materials with less hazardous substitutes 22.90 % - X
Improved recycling of materials, water, waste 35.44 % - -
PRODUCT INNOVATION
Reduced energy use for the customer 35.21 % X -
Reduced air, water, soil, noise pollution 27.64 % - X
Improved recycling of product after use 23.59 % - X
SHARE IN SAMPLE 53.12 % 52.45 %
For each dimension, firms were asked to rate the significance of environ-
mental benefits of introduced innovations on a 4-point ordinal scale with
the categories high, medium, low and no environmental benefits. Table
1 shows whether a certain dimension of environmental innovation is as-
signed to either resource efficiency innovations or only externality reducing
innovations. Please note that process innovations that improve recycling
possibilities are not assigned to any of the two types while product innova-
tions that improve recycling possibilities of the final products are assigned
to innovations that reduce environmental externalities. The reason for this
is the following: Better recycling as a process innovation may be beneficial
for the firm if it safes the consumption of material, water, etc. If this would
be the case, than this effect should already be catched by material saving
innovations. If recycling improving process innovations primarily reduce
the recyclability of waste which is recycled by others (e.g. through reduc-
ing hazardous substances contained in the waste) then it would represent
externality reducing innovations rather than resource saving ones. Due to
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this ambiguity, we do not include recycling improving process innovations.
However, for respective product innovations, it is clear that they only re-
duce externalities from the innovator’s point of view. A further issue worth
to be mentioned is the expected impact of energy saving product innovation
on profitability. Although external to the firm, energy efficiency of products
could be rewarded by the market since it directly reduces user costs and
therefore could lead to higher profitability. To take this possibility into ac-
count, energy saving product innovations are included in the aggregate of
(resource) efficiency improving innovations.
We construct a binary indicator variable for each of the two types which
takes the value 1 if a firm has introduced an environmental innovation in at
least one of the assigned dimensions that had at least a low significance for
environmental benefits.6 In order to investigate hypothesis one, i.e. to see
wether the two types differ in their impact on profitability, we also compute
a dummy variable for any type of environmental innovations which takes
the value 1 if a firm introduced either resource efficiency or externality re-
ducing innovations. If the estimated coefficient of this variable would differ
significantly from the coefficients estimated for the two types, investigating
environmental innovation in general would lead to an aggregation bias.
To investigate our second and third hypotheses, information is needed
whether environmental innovation is induced by government regulation.
Therefore, firms were asked whether innovations with environmental ben-
efits were introduced in response to existing regulation or regulations ex-
pected to be introduced in the future. In both cases, we speak of regulation-
induced innovations.
Combining the two dummies representing the two types of environmen-
tal innovations (t = 1, 2) with the two outcomes of the regulation status, i.e.
regulated (r = 1) and non-regulated (r = 2), gives us four dummies. Firms
that did not introduce innovations with any kind of environmental benefits
form the control group.
Product and Process Innovation - Innovation can have a direct impact on
firm profitability through product or process innovation (see Geroski et al.
(1993)). In terms of product innovations, firms that were able to introduce
a product that is new to their market (market novelty) gain a (temporary)
monopoly position which can be transferred into a price premium. In terms
of process innovation, cost reduction may allow the innovator to keep unit
costs below the market average, providing sources for extra profits. We
6We also tested a model where environmental innovation variables take the value of
one only for innovations with high and medium environmental benefits and zero other-
wise. However, all of these variables performed worse.
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introduce two dummy variables that take the value 1 if a firm introduced
market novelties or cost reducing process innovations in the three year time
period previous to the end of the year for which we observe profit margins.
Market Structure - Without any doubts, market structure is a key determi-
nant of firms’ profitability, especially when measuring profitability with re-
turn on sales as done in the present paper (see Czarnitzki and Kraft (2010)).
A key indicator of market structure is market concentration, i.e. the market
share of dominant suppliers in a given product market. In general, concen-
trate markets may give suppliers bargaining power over their customers
and ease collusion. A standard measure for market concentration is the
Herfindahl index. For this index, we use data at the NACE 3-digit level
offered by the German Monopoly Commission.
A further indicator for price setting opportunities is a firm’s market share.
Shepherd (1972) finds that the market share is a key element of the market
structure and performance relationship. We measure a firm’s market share
by directly asking for the firm’s share in total market sales for its main prod-
uct group.7
Finally, the model includes a dummy indicating a perceived hard com-
petitive environment. The dummy aggregates all six questions in the inno-
vation panel regarding the competitive environment. It takes the value 1 if
at least one of the six possible threat to firms’ competitive position are rated
to be rather the case. The hard competition dummy captures for instance
market specific differences in profitability due to pressure because of mar-
ket entries or due to technology factors, i.e. whether technologies in certain
markets become more quickly obsolete than in others.
Scale Economies and Technology - Unit costs of production and thus prof-
itability may be affected by the scale of production and the technology em-
ployed. Likely scale effects are captured by including firm size, measured
as the logarithm of the number of employees at full time equivalents. Ef-
ficiency gains stemming from a high level of technology are measured by
including the stock of patents since patents represent novel technological
knowledge that can be used exclusively by the inventing firm. The patent
stock is measured as the logarithm of the number of patent applications over
the period 1989 to 2006. We do not include more recent patents since we as-
sume a certain time lag between generating new technological knowledge
7We refrain from interacting the market share with the concentration measure as sug-
gested in the seminal contribution of Ravenscraft (1983) because of estimation problems
when interaction terms are used in non-linear regressions (see Norton et al. (2004)). A
non-linear model is used in this paper for reasons going to be discussed in subsection E.
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and its impact on efficiency. Since a large fraction of firms in the database do
not patent at all, we construct the logarithm of the patent stock by adding
one to the initial number of patents to tackle the zero value problem.
Other-Controls - We control for sector specific unobserved cross-sectional
differences by including 21 sector dummies based on two-digit NACE codes.
A dummy for a firm’s location in East Germany is included since this part
of the country is characterised by specific economic and institutional struc-
tures resulting from the transformation process, including a high level of
public support (see Czarnitzki and Licht (2006)). Finally, the model includes
a control for the firms’ fixed assets-to-sales ratio. At equal cash flows, firms
with a higher stock of fixed assets have higher depreciation rates resulting
in lower return on sales.
E. Estimaton Strategy
The dependent variable (pre-tax return to sales) is a categorial variable
with known thresholds based on seven categories, see appendix. For the
first category of the pre-tax return to sales, the only information we have is
that it takes values of less than zero per cent. Furthermore, for the last cate-
gory, we only know that observations can take values of at least 15 per cent.
Thus, the dependent variable in our survey data is censored from both, the
left and the right. Following Wooldridge (2002) we can estimate the model
by making distributional assumptions. We define the cell limits from the
questionnaire to be a1 < a2 < ... < a7 and assume the error terms to be nor-
mally distributed (instead of standard normally like in the OLS case) and
use a maximum likelihood estimation instead of OLS. This approach dif-
fers from the standard ordered probit model as follows: it "[...] is exactly
ordered probit with cut points fixed and with β and σ2 estimated by max-
imum likelihood" (Wooldridge (2002) p. 509). Such a model is called an
interval regression. Since maximum likelihood is inconsistent under het-
eroscedasticity, we estimate the model using heteroscedasticity robust stan-
dard errors.
IV. ESTIMATION RESULTS
The results from the interval regression are presented in table 2. The ta-
ble reports marginal effects which can be interpreted like in a standard OLS
model for four model variants. While model 1 only includes one dummy
for environmental innovations (EI), model 2 separates the effects of envi-
ronmental innovations by regulation driven and voluntary innovations, and
model 3 separates between resource efficiency and only externality reducing
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innovations. The final model variant contains dummies for each combina-
tion of environmental innovation.
Model 1 finds a positive though only weakly significant effect of environ-
mental innovations on firm profitability. When distinguishing between the
role of government regulation for introducing environmental innovations,
we find that the positive impact on profitability only holds for regulation
driven innovation, while we find no effect (neither positive nor negative)
for voluntary environmental innovations. A Wald test against the Null that
regulation- and non-regulation-induced innovation environmental innova-
tion are equal in their impact on profitability cannot be rejected, however
(p-value = 0.3548). If we would stop at this point, the results of the models
1 and 2 must be interpreted in a way similar as the proponents of Porter’s
hypothesis do. Namely, that regulation improves firms profitability by lead-
ing to innovation that over-compensates regulatory costs. To see that this is
not true in general, the models 3 and 4 add some more complexity to the
analysis.
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Table 2: Estimation Results
DEPENDENT VARIABLE: ESTIMATED MODELS
RETURN ON SALES IN PERCENT 1 2 3 4
EI 0.3981*
(0.2239)
EI_REG (r = 1) 0.5487**
(0.2727)
EI_NOREG (r = 2) 0.3150
(0.2438)
EI_RES (t = 1) 0.9827***
(0.2694)
EI_EXT (t = 2) -0.4861*
(0.2674)
EI_RES_REG (t = 1), (r = 1) 1.4685***
(0.4842)
EI_EXT_REG (t = 2), (r = 1) -0.8121*
(0.4757)
EI_RES_NOREG (t = 1), (r = 2) 0.8068***
(0.3119)
EI_EXT_NOREG (t = 2), (r = 2) -0.4265
(0.3119)
MS_Herfindahl index 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001
(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002)
MS_market share 1.5978*** 1.6011*** 1.6213*** 1.6301***
(0.4062) (0.4061) (0.4062) (0.4062)
MS_perceived hard competition -1.1487*** -1.1487*** -1.1411*** -1.1412***
(0.2041) (0.2041) (0.2038) (0.2038)
PD_market novelties† 0.2226 0.2252 0.2319 0.2349
(0.2613) (0.2613) (0.2610) (0.2612)
PC_reduction of per unit costs† 0.4763* 0.4667* 0.4125 0.4029
(0.2574) (0.2576) (0.2600) (0.2601)
ST_log of patent stock 0.2806 0.2724 0.2675 0.2543
(0.1710) (0.1711) (0.1709) (0.1710)
ST_log of full time employees -0.3528*** -0.3571*** -0.3593*** -0.3637***
(0.0684) (0.0685) (0.0685) (0.0686)
C_location dummy -0.0984 -0.0946 -0.0919 -0.0844
(0.2203) (0.2204) (0.2203) (0.2204)
C_assets-to-sales ratio -0.1185*** -0.1192*** -0.1211*** -0.1217***
(0.0446) (0.0446) (0.0446) (0.0445)
C_sector dummies‡ yes yes yes yes
Constant 6.4695*** 6.4822*** 6.4690*** 6.4876***
(0.4924) (0.4924) (0.4899) (0.4902)
Ln_sigma 1.7881*** 1.7880*** 1.7867*** 1.7865***
(0.0151) (0.0150) (0.0150) (0.0150)
OBSERVATION SUMMARY:
left-censored 474 474 474 474
uncensored 0 0 0 0
right-censored 418 418 418 418
interval 2986 2986 2986 2986
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01, robust standard errors appear in parentheses
† The model includes two dummies indicating missing values in PD and PC, respectively.
‡ The model includes 21 jointly significant sector dummies based on aggregated NACE 2-digit levels.
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Model 3 separates between resource efficiency improving and external-
ity reducing environmental innovations: The prior exerts a statistically high-
ly significant positive effect on profitability while the latter reduce a firm’s
profit to sales ratio. Rejecting the Null of a Wald test (p-value = 0.0022)
that both coefficients are equal in their impact on profitability confirms our
hypothesis one that both types differ in their impact on profitability.
Model 4 further distinguishes both types of innovations into regulation-
induced and non-regulation-induced ones. If the Porter hypothesis holds,
both resource saving innovations and externality reducing innovations in-
duced by regulations must provide a statistically significant positive im-
pact on return on sales. Obviously, this proposition fails an empirical proof.
Regulation-induced innovations that reduce environmental externalities ha-
ve a negative impact on firms’ profitability, however this impact is only
weakly significant. In such a case a firm faces a 0.8121 percentage points
decrease in return on sales compared to the control group, i.e. those firms
which have not introduced innovations with any kind of environmental
benefits. A firm that introduced also innovations that reduce environmental
externalities but not due to regulatory constraints does not face a change in
profitability significantly different from zero. This seems plausible because
it is rather unlikely that a firm would introduce such innovations by its own
choice when no firm benefits can be expected. However, firms which in-
troduced innovations that lead to more resource efficiency in response to
regulation are rewarded by an 1.4685 percentage point increase in returns
on sales compared to the control group. For firms having also introduced
such innovations but not due to regulatory pressure, the premium is only of
0.8068 percentage points compared to the control group. This result is also
quite interesting because it supports Porter’s view that regulation can shift
firm’s attention to potentials for further process improvements, however
only for the case of resource efficiency improving innovations and not in
general. To provide evidence on this paper’s second hypothesis we test the
Null that regulation-induced resource efficiency improving and externality
reducing innovations have equal impact on profitability. The Wald test’s
p-value of 0.0129 allows to reject the Null and provides support for out sec-
ond hypothesis, namely that the Porter hypothesis does not hold in general
but for resource efficiency improving innovations. Also the third hypothesis
in our papers is supported given the data because voluntary environmen-
tal innovations of any type did not significantly reduce profitability. They
increase profitability if they improve resource efficiency.
Finally, the most important controls are of their expected signs. Mar-
ket structure appears to be the most important determinant of return on
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sales while market concentration is found to have no impact. This finding
is consistent with Schmalensee (1989). From an extensive study of the re-
lated literature he postulates the stylized fact that there is only a very small
and weak relationship between concentration on profitability that even dis-
appears in many studies. Heger and Kraft (2008) provide evidence for
this finding and furthermore show that if concentration measures based on
firms’ perceived competitive environment are used, they are of their pre-
dicted sign regarding their effect on profitability. In our model, the dummy
for perceived hard competition has a strong statistically significant and neg-
ative impact on profitability as expected.
The significant negative impact of firm size measured with the log of full
time employees indicates a negative effect of scale similar to Czarnitzki and
Kraft (2010). However, the reason for this finding remains unclear. The
technological level measured with the log of the patent stock does not pro-
vide significant impacts on profitability similar to the innovation variables
for product and cost saving process innovations. The latter appears to have
an significant impact on return on sales only in the models 1 and 2.
V. CONCLUDING REMARKS
There is an ongoing debate on likely competitiveness benefits of environ-
mental regulations, initiated by Porter (1991) and Porter and van der Linde
(1995). In this debate, two parties can be identified. The opponents’ point
of view is conventional economic wisdom. They argue that regulation is a
barrier to competitiveness, or in other words: There is a conflict between
competitiveness and the environment. Porter (1991, p. 168) argues that
this is a “false dichotomy” due to a “static view of competition”. Follow-
ing Porter and van der Linde (1995), regulatory costs may be more than
offsetted by profitability gains of innovations that have been introduced to
comply with regulations. This is the proponents’ point of view in the debate
and has become known as the "strong" version of the Porter hypothesis.
Roughly speaking, our approach does not provide evidence in favor
of any of the both points of view. The key finding is that the valildity of
the Porter hypothesis depends on the nature of regulation-induced inno-
vations. We arrive at this conclusion by distinguishing two types of en-
vironmental innovations and whether they are regulation-induced or vol-
untary. Compared to firms that did not introduce any environmental in-
novation, both regulation-induced and voluntary innovations that improve
resource efficiency increase profitability. This positive effect is larger for
regulation-driven innovation. However, innovations that only reduce en-
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vironmental externalities lower firms’ profitability if they are regulation-
induced whereas voluntary abatement investments do not affect profitabil-
ity significantly.
To unmask the impact of regulation-triggered environmental innova-
tions on profitability, several control variables are constructed that may mask
the relationship of interest. For the controls, we rely on seminal litera-
ture regarding the market structure-performance relationship. Thus, we
include proxies for market concentration, market share and innovative per-
formance.
The implication of our approach is very simple. Environmental regu-
lation cannot be seen as to increase firms competitiveness in any case.The
strong version of the Porter hypothesis seems to be valid only for regula-
tions that allow firms to reduce environmental externalities by increasing
their resource efficiency. However, the present approach leaves important
aspects untouched that are worth to be mentioned. In this study, we do not
look on the long-term effects of regulation-induced environmental innova-
tions on profitability. Porter and van der Linde (1995) argue that especially
in the long run companies will benefit from such innovations, for instance
because of a first mover advantage. Our data does not allow to study this
supposed relationship since the German innovation survey captured envi-
ronmental innovations and the role of regulation for the first time in its 2009
version. We will address this question in future research when data on firm
performance is available for further years.
APPENDIX: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS
Table 3: Summary Statistics of the Dependent Variable
PRE-TAX RETURN ON SALES CATEGORIES FREQUENCY PERCENT
Smaller than 0 % (left-censored ) a1 474 12.22
0 % until < 2% a2 722 18.62
2 % until < 4% a3 656 16.92
4 % until < 7% a4 666 17.17
7 % until < 10% a5 499 12.87
10 % until < 15% a6 443 11.42
15 % and more (right-censored) a7 418 10.78
Total 3878 100.00
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Table 4: Summary Statistics of the Independent Variables
VARIABLES OBS. MEAN STD. DEV. MIN Max
EI 3878 0.6211965 0.4851516 0 1
EI_REG (r = 1) 3878 0.2470346 0.4313426 0 1
EI_NOREG (r = 2) 3878 0.3741619 0.4839682 0 1
EI_RES (t = 1) 3878 0.5312017 0.4990899 0 1
EI_EXT (t = 2) 3878 0.5244972 0.4994639 0 1
EI_RES_REG (t = 1), (r = 1) 3878 0.2163486 0.4118078 0 1
EI_EXT_REG (t = 2), (r = 1) 3878 0.2315627 0.4218854 0 1
EI_RES_NOREG (t = 1), (r = 2) 3878 0.314853 0.4645172 0 1
EI_EXT_NOREG (t = 2), (r = 2) 3878 0.2929345 0.4551673 0 1
MS_Herfindahl index 3878 4600.8478 8300.9498 20.107 99430.292
MS_market share 3878 0.1732166 0.2675355 0.00001 1
PD_market novelties (1) 3878 0.2075812 0.4056275 0 1
PC_reduction of per unit costs (2) 3878 0.2073234 0.4054415 0 1
Indicator for missing values in (1) 3878 0.0092831 0.0959131 0 1
Indicator for missing values in (2) 3878 0.0144404 0.1193129 0 1
ST_log of full time employees 3878 30.700021 10.703573 -0.6931472 130.03182
ST_log of patent stock 3878 0.2235892 0.7506332 0 90.307014
C_assets-to-sales ratio 3878 0.7355721 20.622633 0 720.72727
C_location Dummy 3878 0.3037648 0.4599416 0 1
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